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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE B. PECK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DONALD J. PECK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
| CASE NO. 20057 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding a substantial portion of the remaining marital 
property to the wife where the parties had dissimilar 
earning power, where the wife had contributed to the 
acquisition of marital assets by way of inheritance funds, 
and where the husband had exclusive control of the family 
corporation which had historically produced significant 
income, and continued so to do, until said husband ceased 
all record keeping, failed to maintain corporate assets 
in his custody, and depleted the assets of said corporation 
prior to trial. 
2. The Trial Court did not commit reversible error 
by not making a specific finding as to the husband's earning 
capacity where the court was unable to do so because of 
the husband's failure to make a full disclosure of either 
the assets or the income of the family corporation which 
he exclusively controlled. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent (wife) filed her Verified 
Complaint for divorce on the 6th day of January, 1984, 
in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Carbon 
County, State of Utah (R. 1-4). ShoreLy thereafter, the 
wife's Order to Show Cause requesting the exclusive use 
of the home of the parties, the contents located therein, 
temporary alimony and attorney's fees was personally served 
on the Defendant-Appellant (husband) in the State of Nevada 
on January 27, 1984, thereby ordering his appearance before 
said Court on the 21st day of February, 1984 (R. 8-9). 
The husband elected not to appear for the hearing but was 
represented by Attorney Michael Harrison and, after hearing 
sworn testimony, the Court entered an Order granting the 
wife temporary alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 per month 
together with the other relief prayed for in her Order 
to Show Cause (R. 10-11). Following the hearing, the 
husband's attorney of record withdrew from the case and 
present counsel entered an appearance (R. 18-20). 
Husband's counsel petitioned for rehearing on the 
Temporary Order with respect to the issue of alimony and 
further sought to have the exclusive control of the family 
corporation, Diana, Inc., awarded to him during the pendency 
of the action (R. 22-25). On March 19, 1984, the hearing 
date on the husband's Petition, the parties entered into 
an Oral Stipulation in open court whereby the wife consented 
to the husband's exclusive control of Diana, Inc. and further 
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consented to reserve the issue of temporary support until 
the time of trial (R. 36-37). 
The matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Judge, on April 19, 1984. 
The Trial Court granted a divorce to the wife and awarded 
her the home and its contents, her vehicle and two parcels 
of property in which the parties had an interest. The 
court awarded the husband the family corporation and all 
of the assets thereof, his vehicle, and all of the personal 
property in his possession including his new mobile home 
and the furnishings located there (R. 82-85, 89-91). 
The court granted the wife alimony as well as a 
judgment for a portion of the temporary support covered 
by the wife's Order to Show Cause. Such alimony awards 
are not challenged by this Appeal. 
The Trial Court entered its Findings, Conclusions 
and Decree on the 15th day of June, 1985, copies of which 
are attached hereto as Appendix "A", and the husband 
thereafter perfected this Appeal on the issue of the 
property division only. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on the 16th day of September, 
1950. During the almost 34 years of marriage, five children 
were born as the issue of the marriage, four of whom are 
surviving, and all of whom have obtained their legal age 
of majority and are self-supporting. 
The parties separated on the 6th day of November, 
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1983, after the husband confessed to an extra-marital 
affair and related activities and asked for a divorce (TR. 
16-24). 
In mid-November of 1983, the parties had a conversation 
concerning the commencement of a divorce proceeding and 
during that conversation the husband threatened the wife 
that he would break up the family corporation, pull off 
the project under construction and allow the corporate 
bonding company, which held all of the family's personal 
and real property as collateral, to take everything if 
the wife did not go along with the husband's proposed 
distribution (TR. 80-81, 83-84). 
Subsequent to the husband's threat, the wife became 
aware, through various sources, that the husband was not 
answering company mail, providing blue slips for employees, 
or dealing with any of the general business obligations 
of the family corporation known as Diana, Inc.(TR. 63-
66). The wife attempted to answer the business correspondence, 
filed annual corporate returns in order to restore the 
corporation to good standing, corresponded with creditors 
and raised funds to meet corporate obligations in an attempt 
to preserve the marital assets (TR. 47-49, 63-66, 88-89); 
however, the husband closed all of the corporate bank 
accounts in early December of 1983, and took complete 
control of the family corporate funds after that date (TR. 
88-89, 129-130). From that point on, the husband ceased 
all record keeping on the income of the corporation, ran 
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the business without bank accounts (TR. 130-131), produced 
no records for the corporate accountant (TR. 137-139); 
and did not pay the obligations of said corporation (TR. 
161-165). 
During the marriage, the parties acquired a home 
and adjacent real property upon which a small greenhouse 
business known as Peck's Plants is located; a 58% partnership 
interest in the Swasey property and the installment land 
contract resulting from a partial sale thereof; Miller 
Creek property; various vehicles; a furnished mobile home; 
various household furnishings; and the wholly owned family 
corporation known as Diana, Inc. 
At trial, the wife presented Exhibit 8, Plaintiff's 
Marital Asset Schedule, which was based upon the appraisal 
of James Bartorelli, a real estate appraiser with seven 
years experience in the Carbon County area; his appraisal 
was introduced as plaintiff's Exhibit 7 (TR. 3, 6). The 
husband also offered an Exhibit of Marital Assets, Exhibit 
17. When cross-examined about the methods by which the 
husband had obtained the market values designated thereon, 
he admitted he had no comparable sales for any of the 
properties (TR. 153-154) , he had no bona fide offers for 
purchase with respect to any of the properties (TR. 153), 
he was uncertain as to the outstanding obligations on any 
of the properties (TR. 152), he had been gone from the 
Carbon County area much of the time during the past four 
years (TR. 153), and he got his market values "from 
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the ones they sell on T.V." (TR. 154). 
The home of the parties is located on the Old Spring 
Glen road in Carbon County and is more particularly described 
as parcel #1 of the Bartorelli appraisal (Exhibit 7). 
James Bartorelli valued the home, the greenhouse sheds 
and the land, including a 50 foot strip purchased from 
Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, neighbors, at a total market value 
of $68,588.00. The home and property are subject to an 
outstanding indebtedness in the sum of approximately 
$26,000.00, resulting in an equity of $42,588.00. 
The wife testified that when the State of Utah was 
doing a highway project several years ago, a portion of 
the parties1 property was affected. During the late I970fs, 
the State of Utah had indicated a willingness to deed to 
the parties a strip of land consisting of slightly less 
than one acre, as compensation to the parties for the 
impact of the state project on their property (TR. 26-
27). The wife testified that subsequent to that understanding, 
and upon performance of a title search on the property, 
the State of Utah concluded that it did not own the 
property, as it was subject to claim by the Denver and 
Rio Grande Railroad (TR. 103). Both parties agreed as 
of the date of trial that the State of Utah had not conveyed 
to the parties, or either of them, said strip of property. 
The wife testified that as of the day prior to trial, after 
having reviewed the records of the Carbon County Recorder's 
Office, the property still appeared in the name of the 
6 
State of Utah subject to the Denver and Rio Grande right-
of-way and that said property was a mere expectancy but 
that in the event the property ever was conveyed, it should 
be made part of the legal description of the home property 
as it is adjacent thereto (TR. 26-27, 103). 
The parties accumulated the Swasey property adjacent 
to Highway 50 in late 19 77. The wife sought financial 
backing for the purchase and contacted her personal friend, 
Garn Anderson, who agreed to enter a partnership for the 
purchase of the property (TR. 36). The partnership purchas 
56.63 acres of raw, undeveloped ground located in Carbon 
County (TR. 37-38) for the sum of $70,000.00 (Exhibit 8). 
The property is more particularly described as parcel #2 
of the Bartorelli appraisal (Exhibit 7). The partnership 
subsequently sold twenty acres of ground to Mike Dmitrich 
in December of 1982, for the sum of $80,000.00 on a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (TR. 37-39). The wife testified that 
Mr. Dmitrich selected the best twenty acres of ground for 
his purchase and that the balance of the property owned 
by the partnership was primarily hillside (TR. 38-39). 
The wife testified that $17,400.00 received by the parties 
as their portion of the Dmitrich down payment was loaned 
to Diana, Inc. (TR. 36). James Bartorelli testified that 
the entire Swasey property, including the Dmitrich portion, 
had a fair market value of $42,200.00 as of the time of 
trial (Exhibit 7). He testified to a severe decline in 
the property values in Carbon County during the last three 
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years due to a depressed economic demand for coal (TR. 
12). He further testified to the rampant speculation in 
property which occurred between 1975 and 1982 in Carbon 
County along highways or in the vacinity of proposed 
construction sites (TR. 9-10, 13-14). He testified that 
the Swasey property, being adjacent to a highway, had been 
subject to such speculation (TR. 9-10). Mr. Bartorelli 
testified that he appraised all of the acreage in the 
Swasey property at the rate of $745.19 per acre and that 
the 36.63 acres remaining in the partnership is primarily 
hillside and at the rear of the property and should be 
reduced further in value if it is not considered adjacent 
to the front twenty acre parcel owned by Mike Dmitrich 
(TR. 9-10). The wife additionally testified that the down 
payment and the first two annual payments consisting of 
a total of $14,000.00 came from the wife's inheritance 
from her mother (TR. 39-40)• The wife further testified 
that the remaining proceeds from the Dmitrich contract 
are approximately equal to the remaining obligation to 
Mr. and Mrs. Swasey (Exhibit 8), as the parties considered 
the initial Dmitrich down payment as their equity in the 
Swasey property. 
The parties additionally accumulated a 17 acre parcel 
of property in Miller Creek, Carbon County, Utah from Mr. 
and Mrs. Smith (Schmidts). The property was located 
adjacent to a proposed Industrial Park at the time of its 
purchase in 1980 (TR. 9, 14-32). The wife testified she 
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convinced Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt to sell the property to 
her for the sum of $51,000.00 (TR. 31-32). At the time 
of trial, the parties owed a remaining obligation to the 
Schmidts of $36,800.00. Appraiser James Bartorelli's fair 
market value for the Miller Creek property was the sum 
of $13,000.00 (Exhibit 7). He testified that the failure 
of the proposed Industrial Park had devalued property in 
the Miller Creek area dramatically (TR. 9-10, 12-14). Although 
the Miller Creek property was currently a $23,800.00 loss, 
the wife asked to be awarded that property as she felt 
a personal commitment to Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt for the 
obligation on the property (R. 43 Plaintiff's Closing Argument). 
The wife additionally operated a small nursery known 
as Peck's Plants adjacent to the family home. She testified 
that she currently had geraniums and bedding plants valued 
on the retail market at $4,500.00 (TR. 29). She testified 
that she generally invested approximately $12,000.00 in 
inventory and that she generally earned approximately 
$18,000.00 with such an inventory (TR. 109). The husband 
agreed with her figures (TR. 118). The wife further testified 
that the heavy snows had collapsed the greenhouse buildings 
and furnaces (TR. 27-29) and that due to the total lack 
of support from the husband she had been unable to open 
Peck's Plants and could not do so without capital to restore 
the greenhouse structures and inventory (TR. 29). The 
Trial Court found that the greenhouse business had been 
seriously depleted and that significant capital would be 
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necessary before it could become a profitable concern again 
(R. 81-82). 
The wife additionally owns a 1983 Cadillac which 
was an anniversary gift from the husband and which she 
financed in her own name when the husband failed to pay 
the balance (TR. 44). She valued the car at $14,000.00 
subject to an obligation of $9,000.00 existing at the time 
of trial (TR. 44). The husband has a 1979 GMC Jimmy 
purchased for $13,000.00 (TR. 46) subject tc an obligation 
in the name of the parties' son, Danny Peck, which is being 
paid by the son. The husband valued the Jimmy at $3,500.00 
(TR. 124). A 1977 International Dump Truck which was used 
by Peck's Plants for hauling soil was valued at $2,000.00 
to $2,500.00 by the parties (TR. 30-31, 124). 
The parties acquired various household goods during 
the marriage. The husband listed various items of furniture 
in his Statement of Marital Assets and placed values on 
broad general catagories (Exhibit 17). The wife was unfamiliar 
with most of the items. Both parties agreed that the antiques 
were inherited by the wife (TR. 155). 
The husband purchased a furnished mobile home in 
the Spring of 1984 for the sum of $5,600.00 (TR. 158). 
He testified that while he is the registered owner of the 
mobile home, Diana, Inc. paid $1,000.00 down on the mobile 
home and was obligated to pay the remaining balance on 
the 120 day note. The husband did not list the mobile 
home as a marital asset or corporate asset (Exhibit 16 
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& 17) . 
Finally, the parties acquired Diana, Inc., a wholly-
owned family corporation during the marriage. The parties 
testified that Diana, Inc. was in the business of electrical 
contracting and that the husband has primarily operated 
the family business, utilizing his years of experience 
as an electrical contractor for Utah Power and Light Company 
(TR. 120-121). The estimates of each of the parties concerning 
the amount of money which was earned by and deposited into 
Diana, Inc. during 1983 varies from between $750,000.00 
and $1,000,000.00 (TR. 69-74, 128-129, Exhibit 9 & 10). 
Additionally, the husband acknowledged receipt of the sum 
of $148,000.00 from the Mount Wheeler Power Company Project 
after the date of his closure of the corporation accounts 
(TR. 132). He additionally acknowledged $44,000.00 from 
the Parowan Project (TR. 147). Additionally, Diana, Inc. 
had an $82,000.00 contract in Wells which was not completed. 
The wife testified that the husband pulled off the job 
(TR. 83-84); the husband denied that but did not explain 
the loss of the contract (TR. 146). He had no bank records, 
tax returns or accountant's records for any of these additional 
funds. 
The husband testified that Diana, Inc. had earned 
no money and that he had not drawn a salary or been able 
to pay debts for quite some time (TR. 133-134). He testified 
that he had not drawn an income from Diana, Inc. since 
11 
September or October of 1983 (TR. 134); howerver, when 
presented with his regular payroll checks, signed by him, 
up until the date he closed the accounts in December, he 
acknowledged that he had received those checks in the sum 
of $1/000.00 per month up until the date of the closures 
(TR. 134-137/ Exhibit 10). Then he later contradicted 
that testimony by introducing a W2 Form prepared by Diana, 
Inc., indicating that he earned $3/500.00 fcr all of 1983 
(TR. 136-137/ 169-170/ 175). Finally, he submitted a 
Financial Declaration claiming no income but personal 
expenses for housing, clothing, utilities, food etc. 
(Defendant's Financial Declaration). He then admitted 
that Diana, Inc. paid his mobile home payments (TR. 140), 
provided his utilities (TR. 141,177), paid all his vehicle 
expenses (TR. 140-141) , and provided a clothing allowance 
(TR. 144). 
The testimony concerning the value of Diana, Inc. 
was conflicting. The wife testified that she did not have 
any of the current financial documents for the corporation 
due to her lack of involvement since the Temporary Order 
and that when she contacted the accountant for current 
financial statements, he had no current records from the 
husband with which to prepare a financial statement (TR. 
78). The wife introduced a 1981 financial statement showing 
assets consisting of $94,000.00 in vehicles and $36,500.00 
in equipment (TR. 78 & 172, Exhibit 11). She additionally 
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testified that a $7,000.00 wire puller, 1981 GMC pickup, 
1980 GMC or Chevy pickup and the Ford line truck were 
purchased after the date of that financial statement 
(TR.78-79). Additionally the wife offered Plaintiff's Exhibit 
#12, the April 30, 1983 financial statement which outlined 
the assets of the corporation (TR. 82-83) . The husband 
presented testimony that Diana, Inc. was in debt for $50,000.00 
more than the value of its assets which he valued at a 
total of $25,000.00 (TR. 122, Exhibit 17). He based his 
testimony on Exhibit 16 & 17, his self-prepared statement 
of assets and liabilities exclusively based on his own 
opinion (TR. 121-123). When asked about specific items 
of property reflected in the accountant's prior financial 
statements which were not listed in his Exhibit 16, the 
husband testified that thousand of dollars of equipment 
had been stolen recently (TR. 155-156) or, repossessed 
for nonpayment (TR. 75, 161-163,172-174, 183-185). He 
offered no documentation on what items were stolen (TR. 
156). He was unfamiliar with the building listed on his 
accountant's previous financial statements (TR. 172) and 
did not include it in Exhibit 16; he also felt that the 
accountant had used high values for the vehicles (TR. 172) 
but was unfamiliar with the method of depreciation used 
by the accountants in claiming $80,000.00 worth of depreciation 
on the assets (TR. 160, 173, 175). 
The wife introduced Diana, Inc. payroll and general 
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account checks totalling $49/245.00 made out by the husband 
in the months leading up to the divorce for cash or to Bank 
Club, a check cashing club (TR. 137), which were summarized 
in Exhibit 19. The husband testified that he had cashed 
those checks but claimed that the money was for payroll 
or expenses (TR. 137-138). He testified that he had no 
receipts for any of the money (TR. 139) . He further testified 
that the notations "expenses" or "travel" or "payroll" 
were for the accountant because "almost striLCtly once I 
write a check, I can't remember usually what it's for" 
(TR. 139). He testified that he had no receipts for any 
of the money obtained by cashing the $49, 245.00 worth 
of checks (TR. 137-139). The wife introduced the payroll 
and general account records of Diana, Inc. thru December, 
1983, which showed the payroll, travel and expenses of 
Diana, Inc. paid directly to the employees and suppliers 
by check (Exhibit 9 & 10). 
Finally, subsequent to the closure of the accounts, 
and in the four months leading up to trial, the husband 
ceased payments on many of the corporations obligations 
claiming insufficient funds (TR. 161). One line truck 
in the husband's control was repossessed in April for four 
passed due payments covering December of 1983 through March 
of 1984 (TR. 162) . The husband allowed the second line 
truck to be taken by the parties' son Dan (TR. 75). The 
husband testified that the loss of the line trucks have 
impeded his ability to work and the income of the corporation 
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(TR. 127). The husband further testified that during December 
of 1983 he bought his girlfriend a $1,000.00 ring (TR. 
149), that between December of 1983 and the trial date, 
he had been shopping for a new car (TR. 149-151); that 
he purchased the mobile home and Diana, Inc. paid the $7,000.00 
down payment on it shortly before trial (TR. 158) ; and 
that Diana, Inc. paid for repair work on his girlfriend's 
car (TR. 164). 
Both parties agreed that the husband had not provided 
any support to the wife since October, 1983. 
At the close of testimony, the Court took the matter 
under advisement, received written closing arguments from 
counsel, and entered its Findings, Conclusions and Decree 
on June 15, 1984 awarding the wife the real property in 
Carbon County subject to all obligations thereon her car 
and the household goods. The Court awarded the husband 
his truck, the mobile home and furniture located therein, 
and Diana, Inc. the husband then perfected this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court made an equitable distribution of 
the marital estate based on the disparity in the relataive 
positions of the parties, the wife's contributions by was 
of inheritance and effort in the acquisition of assets, and 
the husband's depletion of the assets of the family cor-
poration. The distribution was based on specific findings 
that the husband had not fully disclosed the value of the 
corporation or his income, that the corporation had histor-
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ically produced significant income and had the capacity 
for future income, and that the wife's nursery business 
was not capable of producing an income without substantial 
capital. Appellant should not be allowed to argue that 
a lack of specificity in the findings, caused by his own 
nondisclosure, constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE CONSIDERING 
THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES, THE WIFE'S 
CONTRIBUTIONS BY WAY OF INHERITANCE AND THE 
HUSBAND'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE OR MAINTAIN THE 
VALUE OF THE FAMILY CORPORATION. 
Pursuant to Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1958 
as amended, the Trial Court may make such Orders concerning 
the distribution of the property accumulated by the parties 
during its marriage as is equitable. 
In determining an equitable division of the marital 
property, the court may consider a number of different 
factors. In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 
1066 (Utah 1951) , the Court listed fifteen such factors 
which may be considered in apportioning the marital estate: 
They include: the respective ages of the 
parties; what each may have given up for the 
marriage; what money or property each put 
into the marriage; the physical and mental 
health of the parties; the relative ability, 
training and education of the parties; the 
duration of the marriage; the present 
income of the parties; the efforts exerted 
by the parties in acquiring marital property; 
the present mental and physical age of the 
parties; the ability of the wife to provide, 
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income for herself; and the ability of the 
husband to provide support. 
Additionally, the determination of the relative value 
of assets contained in the marital estate is a matter for 
the Trial Court which will not be reviewed in the absence 
of a clear abuse of discretion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 
6, (Utah 1982); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 
1980); McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1979). 
The Trial Court division of the marital property will 
not be disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice 
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
Turner v. Turner, Supra; Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 
1980); Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977). 
Where the above stated standards are applied to the 
case at bar, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding the wife the home and real property located 
in Carbon County and the husband the family corporation 
and his mobile home. 
First, although appellant contends that the parties 
are equal (Appellant Brief P.9), the testimony demonstrated 
a disparity between the relative positions of the parties. 
The husband is an electrical contractor with years of 
experience who successfully operated his own business right 
up to the commencement of the divorce proceedings. The 
family corporation he operated had been the primary source 
of support for the parties and their children for a number 
of years; and, the Trial Court found that the corporation 
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was still providing an income to the husband at the time 
of trial (R. 81). On the other hand, the wiEe had been 
primarily a housewife who operated a small nursery adjacent 
to the home of the parties. That business was not operable 
at the time of trial since the greenhouse enclosures had 
been collapsed by snow, the furnace had been damaged and 
the wife had not been able to purchase the $10,000.00 to 
$12,000.00 worth of inventory normally required to open 
the business for the season. It was undisputed that the 
wife had received no support from the husband since October 
of 1983, six months prior to trial. The Trial Court found 
that the nursery business could not be a profitable concern 
without significant capitol (R. 81-82); therefore, the 
relative earning capacity of the parties is markedly 
different. 
Additionally, the efforts of each party in acquiring 
marital assets also was disparate. The wife had inherited 
the funds that constituted the entire family investment 
in the Swasey property; yet, the profit realized by the 
sale of a portion of that property to Mr. Dmitrich was 
loaned to Diana, Inc., not returned to the wife. The 
balance of the Dmitrich contract and the obligation on the 
remainder of the Swasey property were about equal; therefore, 
pursuant to the Decree, tne wife would ultimately end up 
with approximately 36 acres of ground, which would be paid 
for by the Dmitrich contract in approximately 8 years. The 
value of that ground at the time of trial, according to 
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the testimony of the appraiser and considering its terrain 
and location was approximately equal to the wife's original 
inheritance; yet, the husband claimed $80,000.00 in marital 
equity based on his self-prepared statement of value. It 
was undisputed that the wife negotiated the Swasey transaction 
and convinced her friendf banker Garn Anderson, into a part-
nership agreement that enabled the parties to purchase the 
Swasey property. 
At the time of trial, the Schmidt property was valued 
by the appraiser at a net loss of $23,800.00. He testified 
to the economic reasons for the devaluation of the property 
since its purchase. The wife requested that she be awarded 
that property as she had arranged the transaction and felt 
that she had a personal obligation to the Schmidts. 
Given the testimony presented at trial concerning 
the acquisition of the above-stated assets, the Trial Court's 
distribution in the Decree of Divorce constitutes an equitable 
distribution of the marital estate. The wife was awarded 
the home and real property adjacent thereto. Located on 
the property is the nursery business that the wife traditionally 
ran and which might be a source of income for the wife in 
the future if the capital to repair the structures can be 
obtained. The home and its property has a net equity of 
$42,588.00 based upon the testimony of the appraiser. The 
nursery stock had a value of $4,500.00. Thus, that portion 
of the Trial Court's appraisal yielded a total equity to 
the wife of $47,088.00 and also gave her a mortgagable asset 
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which could be used to seek capital for the nursery. The 
Trial Court also awarded the wife the Swasey property, which 
as previously discussed, would return her inheritance of 
$14,000.00 plus interest to her in 8 years. The wife was 
also awarded the Schmidt property and its $23,800.00 loss, 
her car valued at approximately $5,000.00, and the household 
goods, including the antiques which were her inheritance. 
It is obvious that the trial court would not accept the 
husband's blanket valuation of the household goods which, 
according to him, consisted of $25,000.00 in his wife's 
inherited antiques and in excess of .55,000.00 worth of 
household goods and bronzes. The wife was unfamiliar with 
most of these proported valuables and testified that the 
husband picked up what he said he wanted at the time of 
the Temporary Order. 
Using the appraiser's values for the real property 
awarded to the wife and the agreed values for the personal 
property, other than the household goods, the Trial Court's 
award to the wife is as follows: 
1. Equity in home and its property +42,588.00 
2. Stock of Peck's Plants and its 
truck +6,500.00 
3. Her car +5,000.00 
4. Balance of Swasey property after 
Dmitrich contract pays indebted-
ness $14,000.00 Return of Inheritance 
5. Schmidt property -2 3,800.00 
In analyzing the Trial Court's award to the husband, 
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several factors are significant: (1) the husband had withdrawn 
almost $50,000•00 in cash from the family corporation in 
the months preceding the filing of the divorce and that 
at least some of those funds were being utilized to buy 
gifts for and maintain his girlfriend; (2) that the Financial 
Statement for the family corporation showed assets in excess 
of $125,000.00 up until the husband ceased all record keeping; 
(3) that subsequent to the filing of the complaint but prior 
to trial, while the husband had total control of the corporate 
assets, he allowed the depletion of major items of property 
such as the line trucks at the same time he was spending 
money on diamond rings and mobile homes; (4) that the 
husband's testimony with respect to his income from the 
corporation was throughly impeached by his own financial 
declaration, W2 Form and payroll checks; and finally, as 
the Trial Court found in its Findings of Fact (R. 81), (5) 
there was no way to ascertain the true value of the corporation 
at the time of trial nor the husband's income therefrom 
because his record keeping, or lack of it, and the alleged 
but unsub-stantiated loss of assets had not allowed a full 
disclosure. Considering these factors, the Trial Court 
found (R. 81) that the corporation had traditionally provided 
support sufficient to provide for the family and the husband 
as a viable, functioning ongoing concern. If viewed in 
this light, the husband was awarded the following: 
Diana, Inc., a profitable ongoing concern up 
to the date of the commencement of the divorce 
proceeding. 
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The benefit of almost $50,000.00 in cash 
withdrawals leading up to the divorce proceedings. 
His mobile home and furniture valued at 
$5,600.00. 
His truck purchased for $13,000.00 and valued 
by him at $3,500.00. 
All funds received by Diana, Inc. after 
December, 1983. 
The remaining personal property in his 
possession. 
Appellant contends that the wife was awarded 9 0% of 
the marital estate and cites Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871 
(Utah 1979) as authority that such a distribution is tanta-
mount to a clear abuse of discretion that, therefore, the 
distribution must have been intended to be punitive in 
nature. The only way that appellant can argue that the 
wife was awarded 90% of the marital assets is to base all 
figures on the husband's unsubstantiated testimony of value 
on every asset including his wife's inheritance, and 
completely ignore the experienced appraiser and the 
corporate records. Clearly, the Trial Court did not use 
the husband's valuations because they were based solely 
on his uninformed opinion and what he saw on T.V. If the 
husband's self-prepared and uncorroborated statement of 
assets were to be believed, the household furniture would 
be worth more than every other asset the parties own including 
the family corporation. 
The exact percentage of the award to either party 
cannot be determined in this brief any more than it could 
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be determined by the Trial Court (R. 81) because a comparison 
of the pre-December, 1983 corporate accounts with the husband's 
testimony and lack of past-December, 1983 records demonstrates 
a lack of disclosure as to the real value of Diana, Inc., 
without being able to place a specific value on the 
corporation. The Trial Court made an award that restored 
the wife's inheritance, and gave each party the assets 
necessary to provide for their regular employment, living 
accomodations and transportation . As such, the Trial Court 
achieved an equitable distribution of the marital estate 
and did not abuse its discretion in so doing. 
POINT TWO 
POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE WIFE HAD NO PRESENT 
EARNING CAPACITY AND THAT THE HUSBAND'S 
PRESENT EARNING CAPACITY, AND THE SPECIFIC 
VALUE OF HIS CORPORATION WERE UNDETERMINABLE 
DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO FULLY DISCLOSE SAME 
Respondent is in basic agreement with the standards 
of law outlined in Appellant's brief with respect to the 
Trial Court's responsibilities to enter and file Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce in 
accordance with the evidence presented at trial. Respondant, 
however, contends that the Trial Court made the only Findings 
of Fact available to it in light of the husband's contradictory 
testimony and the corporate records. 
The Trial Court made a specific finding (R.81) that 
neither the true value of Diana, Inc. nor the funds taken 
therefrom by the husband could be determined due to the 
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lack of full disclosure. That lack of disclosure was caused 
by the husband's lack of record keeping, his closure of 
the regular corporate accounts, and his failure to maintain 
the regular financial statements which had been routinely 
prepared by the corporate accountant. In short, all 
verifiable evidence of the value of Diana, Inc., ended in 
December of 1983 when the husband assumed control of all 
funds and all assets of the corporation. 
The Trial Court entered specific findings of non-
disclosure as well as findings that the family corporation 
had historically produced significant income, was the only 
source of immediate income at the time of trial, and had 
the potential for future income (R. 81-85). Due to the 
advantageous position of the Trial Court in evaluating the 
relative testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits, this 
Court traditionally gives considerable deference to such 
findings and judgments. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430 
(Utah 1983) . Additionally, this Court will generally not 
disturb the Trial Court's findings if there is substantial 
evidence to support them. George v. Peterson, 671 P. 2d 
208 (Utah 1983). In the case at bar, the Trial Court's 
findings and award are supported by the wife's testimony, 
the appraiser's valuations, the pre-December, 1983 corporate 
records, and the husband's own testimony on cross-examination 
with respect to the corporation's payment of his expenses. 
Any ambiguity in the findings of the Court as to the value 
of Diana, Inc. was caused by the Appellant's failure to 
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disclose, therefore, the property division contained in 
the Findings, Conclusions and Decree should be affirmed 
as an equitable division of the marital estate. 
The Appellant additionally argued that the Trial 
Court's failure to make specific findings as to the earning 
capacities of the parties constitutes reversible error. 
First it should be noted that the Appellant has not appealed 
the award of Alimony in the Decree. He only contends that 
the lack of specificity may be prejudicial to him in the 
future in the event of a petition for modification of the 
Decree. Such is not the case. The Court record contains 
the financial declarations of each party as of the time 
of trial and thereby allows for a re-evaluation of any 
substantial change in their circumstances. Additionally, 
the Trial Court entered a finding that the family corporation 
was the sole source of income at the time of trial as the 
greenhouse business was not capable of providing an income 
(R. 81 & 85). The wife testified she had no income and 
no capacity for future income without capital to operate 
Peck's Plants and the Court so found (R. 85). The Court 
also found that the corporation was providing income for 
the husband but the Trial Court was unable to enter an 
express amount of income due to the husband's own conflicting 
testimony and exhibits. If the Appellant has been prejudiced 
by the Trial Court's findings, he created that prejudice 
himself and should not benefit from it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court made an equitable distribution of 
the marital assets accumulated by the parties during the 
marriage based on the evidence and entered the only Findings 
of Fact available to the Court with respect to the earning 
capacity of the husband and the value of the family cor-
poration as of the date of trial. The Trial Court's dis-
tribution considered the husband's nondisclosure and nis 
depletion of assets and funds from the corporation prior 
to trial while he had exclusive control of the corporation, 
as well as the historical income background of the corporation. 
The Trial Court achieved an equitable balance that allowed 
each party housing, transportation and the opportunity for 
income. And that equitable distribution should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this^&7 day of February, 1985. 
%j£torneys for Respondent 
Suite #4, Oliveto Building 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct and manually 
signed copies of the foregoing were mailed to the following, 
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postage prepaid at Price, Utah, on thist^?^ day of February, 
1985. 
S. Rex Lewis, for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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APPENDIX "A" 
LUKE G. PAPPAS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
23 SOUTH CARBON AVENUE 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
PHONE: 801 /637-0177 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
CAJ.JCNML'KTY.UTAH 
F.'LKO 
i! •! 15 E3 
r.-:wj:A r .ISCJIAM. CLERK 
L::."U7f 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE B. PECK, 
Plaintiff; 
vs 
DONALD J. PECK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No 14078 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and, 
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel, 
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant 
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis; 
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully 
advised in the premises now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident 
of Carbon County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three 
months immediately next prior to the commencement of this action. 
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2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married on the 
16th day of September, 1950 at Elkp County, Nevada and have 
been husband and wife since that time. 
3. That there have been five children born as the issue 
of this marriage, four of whom are still living and all of whom 
have attained their legal age of majority and are self-supporting. 
4. That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruelly 
causing her great mental stress and suffering. 
5. That the parties hereto have accumulated substantial 
real and personal property during this thirty-four year marriage. 
That the Court is having difficulty in properly trying to 
distribute those assets because they are not liquid and nearly 
all of them are subject to debt that require monthly or annual 
payment in substantial amounts and the evidence does not disclose 
a viable source from which such payments can readily be made. 
The matter is further complicated in that the Court feels that 
the true value of Diana Corporation has not been fully disclosed 
nor has the income been taken from that company by the Defendant. 
It appears obvious that the Defendant is living off the income 
from the company but the evidence is lacking as to the extent 
of such draws or the availability of funds from which to order 
any direct payments or alimony payments. The only source of income 
to the parties at the time of the divorce hearing was the 
corporation which, over the years, has been the primary source 
of income along with the greenhouse business that has been depleted 
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to the point where more capital is going to have to be expended 
to make it a profitable concern. Taking in to consideration the 
exhibits introduced at trial and the difficulties outlined herein, 
the Court hereby finds that the real and personal property 
accumulated by the parties is awarded as follows: 
A. To the Plaintiff: 
1. The home of the parties located at the 
Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together 
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any 
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject 
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff 
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless 
therefrom. Said property located in Carbon County, State of 
Utah, is more particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 1758 f t . West of the Southeast 
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast 
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South 
Range 9 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
and running thence North 0°25f East 60 
feet ; East 308 f t . ; thence Southwesterly 
400 feet to in te r sec t ion of the East 
r ight of way of highway; thence Northeaster ly 
along said r ight of way 190 feet to point 
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29 
feet and West 1421.87 feet of East 1/4 
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00f 
West 70.71 fee t ; thence West 248 fee t , more 
or l e s s ; thence North 00°34f West 45 fee t ; 
thence North 08°28 ,53M East 5.05 fee t ; 
thence East 298 fee t , more or l e s s to point 
of beginning. 
Including a l l appurtenances and improvements 
thereto appertaining. 
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2. All of the household furniture, fixtures, 
appliances and like household items now located in the home of 
the parties together with any bronze or antique items . 
3. The Swasey property together with all 
right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided 
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon 
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Swasey 
property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL II 
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9 
East, SLB&M; SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also, 
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet 
West of the Northeast Corner of Section 
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence East 
520 feet; thence Northeasterly along West 
bank of canal to a point 570 feet East 
of beginning; thence West 570 feet to 
point of beginning. Also, beginning 
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 1; 
thence West 820 feet; thence South 
500 feet; thence East 570 feet; thence 
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North 
80 feet to point of beginning. 
Containing approximately 56.63 acres 
and including all appurtenances and 
improvements thereto appertaining. 
4. That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek 
property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness 
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Miller 
Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is 
more particularly described as follows: 
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PARCEL I I I 
Beginning at the North 1/16 Corner o f 
of Sect ion 4 and Sect ion 3 
Township 15 South, Range 10 East of 
SLB&M; sa id corner being marked wi th 
a 1/2 inch pipe in the ground; thence 
North, 0°37 f30" West 50 f e e t t o the point 
of beginning; thence South S ^ S ^ S * 1 
West 639.42 f e e t ; thence North 0°45 f 
West 1234.82 f e e t ; thence North 
89°41 ,54" East 642.13 f e e t a long the 
North l i n e of the Sect ion t o the NE 
corner of Sect ion 4; thence South 
0°37 f30" West 1232.32 f e e t a long the 
East l i n e of Sect ion 4 t o the point of 
beginning. 
Containing approximately 17 acres and 
including a l l improvements and appurtenances 
thereto appertaining. 
5. That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the greenhouse 
bus ines s together with a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t e d a c c e s s o r i e s 
inc luding the 19 77 Internat ional dump truck. 
6. That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac 
automobile provided that she assumes the outstanding 
indebtedness thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
B. To the Defendant: 
1. Al l of the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in that 
Corporation known as Diana, Inc. subject t o a l l indebtednesses 
owed on any of the equipment or owed by t h e company i t s e l f 
to any cred i tors , and upon which Defendant s h a l l hold P l a i n t i f f 
harmless . 
2. The 1979 GMC v e h i c l e subjec t to any 
outstanding indebtedness thereon provided that he holds the 
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom. 
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3. All of the personal items of property 
in Defendants possession. 
C. The family annuity insurance policy through 
Travelers Insurance s h a l l remain in effect in i t s current 
s t a t e and each of the p a r t i e s s h a l l remain the benef ic iary 
of the other . 
6. Since the corporation i s the only source of immediate 
income and have, based upon i t s p r io r business record, the 
po ten t i a l of future income, the Court orders tha t the 
Defendant pay the P l a in t i f f as and for alimony, the cash 
sum of $10,000.00, payable at the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year 
with the f i r s t payment due on or before December 31, 1984 and 
l i k e payments due on or before December 31 of each and every 
year thereaf te r u n t i l sa id cash sum has been paid in f u l l . 
This amount wi l l a s s i s t the P l a i n t i f f in r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g the 
greenhouse business so tha t she can be se l f - suppor t ing . 
7. The Court orders tha t each of the p a r t i e s hereto pay 
t h e i r own costs and attorneys fees . 
8. The Court previously entered a temporary order requi r ing 
the Defendant to pay to the P l a i n t i f f the sum of $1,500.00 per 
month as temporary alimony during the pendency of t h i s ac t ion . 
The Defendant made a Motion to vacate said order on the grounds 
tha t he did not have income in which to pay tha t amount. 
The Defendant did not personally appear, but appeared through 
Counsel at the time the Court heard the o r ig ina l Order To Show 
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Cause and the Court denied the Motion to vacate the temporary 
order but does alter its order to make it effective for 
the period of one month covering the period from the date of the 
Order To Show Cause on March 19, 1984, to the trial date 
on April 19, 1984. The Decree shall provide that Defendant 
shall pay the temporary alimony sum of $1,500.00 due under 
the temporary order to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days 
from the date of this Decree. 
9. On the grounds that the parties have been separated 
for in excess of six months, the Court finds cause to waive 
the three month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow 
the Decree of Divorce issued in this case to become absolute 
and final upon its entry by the Clerk of the Court in 
the Registry of Actions. 
10. That the Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of 
her Complaint by adequate evidence. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact 
now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the Defendant. 
2. That the property and debts accumulated by the parties 
during this marriage are awarded pursuant to paragraph five and 
subdivisions thereof of the Findings of Fact. 
3. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
the case sum of $10,000.00 for and as alimony, payable at the 
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rate of $2 ,000 .00 per year with the f i r s t payment due on or 
before December 311 1984 and l i k e payments due on or before 
December 31 of each and every year t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l s a i d cash 
sum has been paid in f u l l . This amount w i l l a s s i s t the P l a i n t i f f 
in r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g the greenhouse bus iness so that she can be se l f -
supporting. 
4 . That each p a r t i e s i s ordered to pay h i s or her 
r e s p e c t i v e court cos t s and attorneys fees in t h i s matter. 
5. That the Defendant i s ordered to pay t o the P l a i n t i f f 
the sum of $1,500.00 for and as temporary alimony due pursuant 
to fche Order To Show Cause and to pay same to the P l a i n t i f f 
wi th in s i x t y (60) from the date of the Decree o f Divorce in 
t h i s matter. 
6. For good cause shown, the Court waives the subsequent 
three month in ter locutory wait ing period so as to allow the 
Decree of Divorce i s sued herein to become abso lu te and f i n a l 
upon i t s entry by the Clerk of Court in the Regis try of Act ions . 
DATED t h i s / 5 d a y o f June, 1984. 
BY ^Mf^SuRT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
S. REX LEWIS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE B. PECK, 
Plaintiff; 
vs 
DONALD J. PECK, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 14078 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and, 
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel, 
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant 
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis; 
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully 
advised in the premises and having entered the foregoing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1.' That Plaintiff is granted a Divorce from Defendant. 
2. That the property accumulated by the parties during 
this marriage is awarded as follows: 
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A. To the Plaintiff: 
1. The home of the parties located at the 
Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together 
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any 
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject 
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff 
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless 
therefrom. Said property located in Carbon County, State of 
Utah, is more particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 1758 f t . West of the Southeast 
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast 
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South Range 
.9 East , Sal t Lake Base and Meridian 
and running thence North 0°25 l East 60 
feet ; East 308 f t . ; thence Southwesterly 
400 feet to i n t e r sec t ion of the East 
r igh t of way of highway; thence Nor theas ter ly 
along sa id r i gh t of way 190 feet to point 
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29 
feet and West 1421.87 feet to East 1/4 
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00' 
West 70.71 fee t ; thence West 248 fee t , more 
or l e s s ; thence North 00o34' West 45 f ee t ; 
thence North 08o28'53" East 5.05 fee t ; 
thence East 298 fee t , more or l e s s . t o point 
of beginning. 
Including a l l appurtenances and improvements 
there to apper ta in ing . 
2. All of the household fu rn i tu re , f i x t u r e s , 
appliances and l i k e household items now located in the home of 
the pa r t i e s together with any bronze or antique i tems. 
Page Three 
3. The Swasey property together with all 
right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided 
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon 
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Swasey 
property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL II 
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9 
East, SLB&M: SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also, 
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet 
West of the Northeast Corner of Section 
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence 520 
feet; thence Northeasterly along west 
bank of canal to a point 570 feet Eafct of 
point of beginning; thence West 570 feet to 
point of beginning. Also, beginning 
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 1; 
thence West 820 feet; thence South 
500 feet; thence East 570 feet feet; thence 
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North 
80 feet to point of beginning. 
Containing approximately 56.63 acres and 
including all appurtenances and improvements 
thereto appertaining. 
4. That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek 
property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness 
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Miller 
Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL III 
Beginning a t the Northl/16 Corner of 
Sect ion 4 and Sec t ion 3 
Township 15 South, Range 10 East of 
SLB&M; s a i d corner be ing marked with 
a 1/2 inch pipe in the ground; thence 
North 0 °37 , 30 u West 50 f ee t to the p o i n t 
of beg inn ing ; thence South 89 028'35M 
West 639.42 f e e t ; thence NoVth 0°45 l 
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West 1234.82 fee t ; thence North 
Sr'Al'SA" East 642.13 feet along the 
North l ine of the Section to the NE 
corner of Section 4; thence South 
0°37 ,30n West 1232.32 feet along the 
East l ine of Section 4 to the point of 
beginning. 
Containing approximately 17 acres and 
including a l l improvements and appurtenances 
thereto apper ta in ing , subject to reservations and 
rights-of- way of Record. 
5. That P l a i n t i f f is awarded the greenhouse 
business together with a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t ed accessories 
including the 19 77 In t e rna t iona l dump truck. 
6. That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac 
automobile provided tha t she assume the outstanding 
indebtedness thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
B. To the Defendant: 
1. All of the r i g h t , t i t l e and in t e re s t in that 
Corporation known as Diana, Inc . subject to a l l indebtednesses 
owed on any of the equipment or owed by the company i t s e l f 
to any c r ed i t o r s , and upon which Defendant sha l l hold P l a i n t i f f 
harmless. 
2. That 1979 GMC vehicle subject to any 
outstanding indebtedness thereon provided that he holds the 
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom. 
3. All of the personal items of property in 
Defendants possession. 
3. That the Defendant i s ordered to pay to the P l a i n t i f f 
the sum of $10,000.00 as a lump sum cash alimony payment, 
payable at the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year with the f i r s t 
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p yment due on or before December 31, 1984 and like payments 
due on or before December 31 of each and every year thereafter 
until said cash sum has been paid in full. This amount will 
assist the Plaintiff in re-establishing the greenhouse business 
so that she can be self-supporting. 
4. Each party is hereby ordered to pay his or his 
respective court costs and attorneys fees in this matter. 
5. That Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
the sum of $1,500.00 pursuant to the temporary alimony order 
and to pay said amount to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days 
from the date hereof. 
6. For good cause shown, the Court waives the three 
month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow this Decree 
of Divorce to become absolute and final upon entry by the 
Clerk of Court in the Registry of Actions. 
7. The family annuity insurance policy through 
Travelers Insurance shall remain in effect in its current 
state and each of the parties shall remain the beneficiary 
of the other. 
DATED this /yday of June, 1984. 
COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
S. REX LEWIS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce to S. Rex Lewis, of HOWARD, LEWIS, 
& PETERSEN, Attorneys for Defendant, 120 East 300 North 
Street, P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603 this ^  day of June, 
1984. 
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